you should have known learned better
jennifer lackey argues for a summative account of justified group belief¹ using a thought experiment, ignoring evidence. in this pair of papers, i develop the framework of normative distributivity to understand the challenge to non-summativism posed by this thought experiment. in light of this framework and recent research into inquisitive reasons, i argue that ignoring evidence, and lackey's argument more broadly, is best understood as showing that norms of inquiry are summative, not that norms of belief are.
names are not enough
paradigmatic examples of hermeneutical injustice² involve a lacuna, where a term to describe an important social experience is absent. this paper introduces hermeneutical dilution and monumentalization as two categories of hermeneutical occlusions which, in contrast, do not require an absence. instead, these occlusions arise from challenges to the utility of existing terms. dilution and monumentalization populate a ragged landscape of hermeneutical conflicts and illustrate challenges to hermeneutical justice.
text █
² hermeneutical injustice refers to the injustice done to people when they are unable to understand and communicate important personal & social experiences due to inequity in the shared interpretive resources.